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The simplest definition of Indigenous people, obviously enough, is that they are the only ones who have
not come from somewhere else. (Wolfe, 2016, p. 16)
1 INTRODUCTION
With a nod to Mahmood Mamdani (1998), Raef Zreik asked, in an article of the same title: “When Does a Settler
Become a Native?” (Zreik, 2016). Zreik begins his article by exploring the terms of the question itself: Is it historical
(how much time needs to pass for the settler to become a native?), sociological (what changes must the settler go
through to become a native?), ethical (what actionsmust the settler undertake in order to become a native?) or perhaps
personal (is it sufficient for the settler to start feeling like he is a native?)? Although Zreik does not count “structural”
among the question’s possible forms, his response is verymuch informed by the understanding of settler colonialism as
a structure—articulated most systematically by Patrick Wolfe. In very different ways, and with different conclusions,
both Zreik and Mamdani claim that only with a radical change in the structure of the settler state can the categories
settler/native be dissolved; not, as the title proposes, in ways that turn the settler into a native, but in ways that make
this distinction less meaningful, at least in its political bearings (see also Wolfe, 2016). The question, more accurately
framed, is thus whether a settler can cease to be a settler, and the response is decolonization itself. We insist here on
“decolonization” and not “completion,” even though Zreik, like others, proposes that the settler ceases to be a settler
alsowhen the colonial project is “completed,…as inAustralia and theUSA” (Zreik, 2016, p. 356). This framing, however,
erases the political claims of natives in these geopolitical contexts (Simpson, 2014, p. 11).1
In this article we want to explore the converse query. Rather than asking, “can a settler become a native, and if so,
how?,” we inquire: “can a native become a settler, and if so, how?” If the answer to the first question involves laying
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pathways toward decolonization, our question is a way of tracing the formation of the settler project, and as part of it,
its structure.
Our article puts forward a dual argument, a historical one and a conceptual one. First, we seek to unfold a specific
history of natives who, we argue, became settlers: Jews who lived in Palestine before the Zionist era. Focusing on two
issues—language and land—we trace themovement of local Sephardi Jews2 between being natives and settlers against
the backdrop of the rise of the Zionist project in Palestine. Our main argument is that, although these Palestinian
Jews worked to craft alternative social spaces that would transcend, overcome, or at least bypass the rigid colonial
dichotomy,3 and although such spaces became momentarily possible, eventually the space was organized within a
settler-colonial pattern and the Palestinian Jews had to find a position along the colonial dichotomy of native/settler.
Our second argument concerns the structure of settler colonialism that we seek to excavate from these historical
details. Working primarily through analytical frames provided by Wolfe, Mamdani, and Fanon,4 we aimed to identify
the principles underlying settler colonialism, focusing on the interconnection between place, race, andmovement. Our
case study runs counter to the idea (common toWolfe andMamdani) that the category of settlers necessarily emerges
throughmovement. Though settlers are very often defined as geographical outsiders, our case study concerns people
whowere transformed from being natives into settlers without moving. At the same time, Fanon’s insistence that race
is the defining element in the category of settlers proves insufficient here, since the racial status of the Arab-Jews
within the Zionist settler mechanism did not fit into a one stable national and colonial racial structure: racially they
were almost conflated with Arabs rather than with the dominant settler cohort (even if never fully so).5 Thus, our case
study reveals a settler structure whose formation was more fluid and multifaceted than can be captures with a single
category. Such fluidity opens up different possible histories and thus also different possible futures.
The argument, then, has both conceptual and political implications. Conceptually, much like Zreik andMamdani, we
aspire to contextualize and problematize the settler/native binary by showing howa group of people can hold, at differ-
ent historical moments (and sometimes simultaneously), the positions of both settler and native. Viewing the Zionist
settler project from the native Jews’ perspective undermines the clear-cut separationmechanisms between native and
settler—as well as east and west, Arab and Jew—and thereby calls us to rearticulate some of the main understandings
of the settler colonialism paradigm.
Politically, returning to this period of unsettled categories is of a particular value for the present moment, a time
when the rhetoric of the two states solution is being gradually abandoned. Even if the two states option may never
have been viable, or has not been an option for a long while, the language of political separation has dominated
public discourse in Israel for several decades. However, in recent years Israel has not only began to speak a different
language, in which the two-states option is “no longer” desired; it is actively engaged in reshaping the constitutional
foundations of the state and preparing the infrastructure for the annexation of the West Bank, thereby giving a legal
anchor to the long-standing fact of its control over the entire territory. The horizon seems to be a political model that
unites the territory into a single political entity, albeit one that is based on separation between the different governed
groups. The Arab-Jews of Palestine offered an altogether different model for a unified territory, based on a shared
space rather than separation. Their endeavors offer an important lesson in the process of imagining a political future
beyond the logic of partition. As the future of the Jewish project in Palestine/Israel may be on the verge of a turning
point, this is a crucial time to offer alternative visions for its formation.
We begin with a methodological section (Section 2) on the paradigm of settler colonialism and its applicability
to our discussion. We also consider in this section the methodology of working through the question of language in
the Zionist/Israeli settlement project. We show that the dual separation between Arabic and Hebrew and between
Arabic and the land (Palestine) was one of the core elements of the Zionist project as a settler project. Against
these (settler) efforts to reorganize space and establish a European-Hebrew/Jewish national entity, Section 3 traces
native efforts by local Sephardi Jews to construct a shared Hebrew-Arabic bilingual (and binational) space. Section 4
examines the cooperation and involvement of some native Jews in land purchase activities. We argue that, even if not
intentionally, this involvement worked counter to the efforts to create a shared space that would not be subjected to
the hierarchical logic of colonization. Section 5 explores how the complex positionality of the local Jewswaned as they
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were interpolated into the settler project. The article’s final section provides more conceptual reflections, situating
the histories outlined in sections 3 to 5within amore systematic analysis of settler colonialism.
2 TWO METHODOLOGICAL NOTES
2.1 Settler colonialism
With the recent emergence of settler colonial studies as a discipline there has beenmuch debate over the applicability
of this framework to the Israeli/Palestinian framework.6 As with any paradigm, the applicability of the general scheme
to a particular context remains limited, yet as Zreik (2016) puts it “as far as the dynamics, the technology, the settling
project of taking over the land, and the relationship to the native are concerned, Zionism does fit into a paradigm.”We
shall therefore work with it here, yet with important caveats. Ann Stoler (2006) calls us to note that each and every
colonial case is unique. We can say the same about settler colonialism. Thus, while we adopt this category as the most
apt for our case, and while we accept that it is largely a political category distinct from colonialism—some would even
say it is an “antitype category” of colonialism (Veracini, 2010, p. 9)—we also see the insistence on rigid separations
between these orders as unproductive in some cases.7 This insistence, which has come to dominate settler colonialism
as a paradigm, often erases not just the unique nature of these different contexts, but also themultiplicity of orders and
rationales organizing each. Palestine of the early 20th century was placed within several regimes of racialization and
political rule that were at times contradictory: it was a settler colony in the making; a colony situated at the core of a
struggle between several imperial forces; and part of theOttoman imperial order,with its own racial orders.8 To reduce
all this to one paradigm is analytically misleading and politically problematic. We are thus invested in the category of
settler colonialism only to the extent that it allows these complexities and intersections between different colonial,
indigenous, and imperial (racial/sectarian) structures to surface, even if it means that the category itself emerges as
having widemargins.
Our analysis also suggests that the formation of settler colonialism in Israel/Palestinewas not a necessary outcome
of the existing Jewish presence in Palestine, or even of the Jewish immigration to Palestine. Not only do we focus here
on Jews who lived in a non-colonial structure withMuslims and Christians in Palestine (albeit under Ottoman imperial
rule); we point to a model, foregrounded by these Jews, of a Jewish existence in Palestine (including immigration to
Palestine) that took the formof shared indigenousness (Campos, 2010; Svirsky&Ben-Arie, 2017). Indeed, thepotential
modes of inhabiting the land that we review here, combined with the fact that a minority of Jews resided in the land
before the waves of Jewish immigration, as well as with the idea of a nation returning to its homeland, could have
facilitated a Jewish-Palestinian political space that was organized according to a non-colonial logic (Campos, 2010;
Jacobson, 2011). However, the particular mode that Jewish presence took in Mandatory Palestine and certainly after
1948, eventually stabilized Israel within the parameters of settler colonialism.
In this way, our analysis of Israel/Palestine as a settler colony seeks to trouble a primary category of the paradigm,
which is already under some critique. InWolfe’s (1999) account, one of the three main elements of the settler colonial
structure is “an empirical binarism” separating settlers and indigenes. This binary is not strictly racial, and in later writ-
ings (2016)Wolfemakes sure ofworking through thehistoricities and constructionof race, and to show themultiplicity
of racial divisions alongside the social process throughwhichdifference is produced. Specifically, settler logics allow for,
even facilitate, themalleability of racial constructs in the nameof establishing settler’s domination. The binary is there-
fore not strictly racial, even if it expresses itself in racial terms. It is rather a geographical binary, between those who
were in the land and thosewho came to it from outside (invaded). This is why, forWolfe, the process throughwhich the
categories of native and settler dissolve—that is, through which assimilation occurs—is the fortification of the settler
colonial state rather than its potential eradication (assimilation, he argues, being a strategy to eliminate the native).9
ForWolfe, this process has a clear historical trajectory:Whenone goes back in time, binarism ismademore visible until
it is a non-refutable fact—invasion. This relation to territory—to location andmovement, the distinction between those
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who were here before and those who were not—is the empirical fact alongside which all other differentiations (racial,
cultural, class, economic) are constructed (Wolfe, 1999, p. 180; 2016, Part 1).
What our case study shows, however, is that even this difference between locals and invaders is constructed. Rather
than returning back in time to the original moment in which difference emerges as a matter of fact, our return in time,
in a proto-Foucauldian move, is to a moment before the territorial binarism of native/invader was institutionalized in
order to observe its very creation. Accordingly, ourmode of questioning is similar to that of Zreik andMamdani, whose
inquiry into the settlers who can (or cannot) become natives seeks to challenge this binarism as part of a project of
decolonization. The fracturing of binarism is, for them, not the entrenchment of the settler state, as it is for Wolfe,
but rather the fracturing of the colonial structure. At least in Zreik’s case, this is probably a function of the context.
Due to the Jewish separatist project, which was simultaneously unifying (all Jews presumably became one of a single
project) and exclusionary (only Jews – a category to which one cannot easily convert), assimilation is not translated
to this context from the Australian or North American ones. Even if before 1948 and during the first months of the
war therewere some believed that Palestinians could be assimilated to the state-building project, theyweremarginal-
ized after the great exodus of 1948, which opened the possibility of imagining a relatively pure Jewish state.10 Against
this backdrop, the very possibility of “assimilation” into a single body of citizenship is a radical political horizon in the
Israeli/Palestinian case—a complete democratization of the state.
Yet, unlike bothZreik andMamdani, who take the settler formation as given and seek to imagine its possible futures,
we seek to understand the historical formation of the settler structure itself. To some degree, much like any other
genealogical project, a return to this moment is an endeavor to question what now seems to be empirical (Foucault,
1998). In this context, it is important to emphasize that our claim is not that there were not structural binary distinc-
tions, hierarchies, and modes of exclusion between Zionist Jews and Arab Palestinians, or between Palestinian Jews
and those who immigrated from Europe; but to themoments in which binarismwas still not altogether clear, and com-
plicate the binary by contextualizing it. This mode of reading history opens up alternatives that emerged and were
abandoned—alternatives going beyond partition or separation.11 Indeed, as Marcelo Svirsky (2014) argues, it is pre-
cisely the ontology of binarism, as he terms it, that, “put[s] politics to death.”
In this regard, it is important to add that although we use here, for the sake of clarity, a seemingly rigid divide
between “Sephardi natives” and “Ashkenazi settlers,” this divide can be contextualized and further historicized as well,
and it, too, is a matter of positionality and identification no less than amatter of ethnicity and origin.
2.2 Transformation (themovement of land and people)
The Zionist project included a transformation of place as well as of its inhabitants—a movement both geographical
(immigration, transfer) and discursive/political (moving the land, as it were, westward, and transforming landscapes
and their meanings). Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin situates this movement within the ethos of the “negation of exile.” The
process of negation “can be interpreted as the negation of all that was considered ‘Oriental,’” as part of an effort to
“integrate the Jews and their history into the narrative of the west” (Raz-Krakotzkin, 2005, p. 167). Accordingly, “The
transformation of the Jew into the new Jew, was also the transformation of the land that attempted to preserve the
Arab ‘view.’”
As he goes on to argue: “This rejection haddramatic implications for the Jews fromArab countries” (Raz-Krakotzkin,
2005, p. 170).
The ethos of the negation of exile thus encapsulates the essence of Zionism as a settler colonialist movement: an
eastboundmovement that sought to eliminate the old exilic (eastern) Jewish identity while also negating the local cul-
tural and historical heritage of the land and its native residents.12 This was a process that was simultaneously sym-
bolic: how land is imagined (Shohat, 1988; Shumsky, 2014); geopolitical (the physical removal of Arabs from the land);
and material; consisting of the shaping of space (Tzfadia & Yacobi, 2011; Yiftachel, 2006) alongside the eradication of
physical traces of Arab presence, past and present (Abu El Haj, 2001; Khalidi & Elmusa, 1992).13
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If we argue that the Arab-Jews of Palestine were ultimately “settlerized” without having moved, then this transfor-
mation of place itself is one of the means by which their position was transformed: with the “movement” (westerniza-
tion) of the space, those who stayed put “moved” across the colonial scheme and were transformed—de-Arabized and
de-nativized (Shenhav, 2006; Shohat, 1999). Within the many layers that compose this movement, we focus on lan-
guage. Yet language in this context cannot be seen solely as a cultural product, as it played a crucial role in the very
material facets of transferring land and rendering it available to Jewish settlement. From the beginning, the Zionist
“redemption of the land” was associated with the so-called “revival of Hebrew” (Saposnik, 2010), with “Hebrew” being
used in relation to a range of issues beyond the tongue one speaks. Hebrew became a marker of nationality, with ref-
erences to ideas such as the “Hebrew nation”; it became (as part of this mark of nationality) the idiom organizing eco-
nomic relations, particularly in the Zionist campaign for “Hebrew labor” (Avoda Ivrit) that was in fact a call to boycott
Arab workers in the Jewish colonies (see Khalidi, 1997; Shafir, 1989); and it played a role in transforming space and
reclaiming Jewish ownership while negating the indigenes’ claims to the land, via toponymic changes (replacing Arabic
with Hebrew names) and remapping projects, which are at the core of settler colonial movements (Abu El Haj, 2001;
Benvenisti, 2002; Masalha, 2007). On all these different levels, “Hebrew” was the mark and tool of the de-Arabization
of the land.
In addition, language helped in shaping the racial contours of the land’s inhabitants. After being one of the basic
elements in the orientalization of Jews in Europe through the creation of the “Semite” as a linguistic-racial category
(Anidjar, 2007), language (this timeHebrew, rather than “Semitic” languages) becameoneof the key elements in the de-
orientalizing of the Jew: Hebrew was able to “return” to the east, to become the language of the land (Palestine), only
after it was reconstructed as a European language, dissociated from its oriental and Semitic origins. Rather than being
conceived as an indigenous language rooted in the historic and contemporary east—a relative, as it were, of Arabic—
Hebrew thus became part of the westernization of the land.
The demand to speak Hebrew was, accordingly, entangled with the demand to abandon, simultaneously and
relatedly, Arabic and (Arab) native-ness. The Arab-Jews were caught up in this effort to eliminate Arabic as part of an
effort to displaceArabs. Arabic, their own language,was gradually labelled a foreign language, and then the language of
the enemy (Eyal, 2006;Mendel, 2014). This is where our story ends, yet we aremore interested in its earlier moments:
moments of potential opportunities created by local Palestinian Jews. If Zionism as a settler colonialist project took
Hebrew to be a mark of a new Jewish indigeneity that was organized around the exclusion of Arabic and used to
demonstrate exclusive land ownership, the alternative we foregrounded here via the Palestinian Jews saw Hebrew as
a language that should not replace, but join Arabic as the language of the land, creating an indigeneity that was based
onHebrew–Arabic bilingualismwith a constant movement (translation) between Arabic andHebrew.14
3 LANGUAGE(S) OF THE LAND
Let us begin with the end, or at least, one possible end. On February 26, 1922, roughly four and a half years after the
publication of the Balfour Declaration, the newspaper al-Sabah published a call to local Jews from Jamal al-Husayni,
issued on behalf of the Arab Executive Committee and titled “Come to Us.” al-Husayni then the secretary of the Arab
Executive Committee and a prominent politician, addressed the native Jews directly:
To our Jewish fellow natives of the homeland, to those who were cheated by Zionism, to those who under-
stand the goals and damage of Zionism—to them we extend our hands today and call: Come to us! We are your
friends!… you and we are the sons of the same homeland, whether the Zionists like it or not…We are sorry for
your persecution by the Zionists, for the denial of your rights, freedom, and ability to explore your goals and aspi-
rations.We consider this to be an offense against the honor of the Palestinian nation, whose sons you are. Hence,
yourMuslim and Christian brothers strongly protest against these actions, extend their arms, and call you: Come
to us! (Quoted in Jacobson & Naor, 2016, p. 22).
6 EVRI AND KOTEF
This address rested on a long history of shared lives among the various communities inhabiting Palestine before the
Zionist movement: Muslims, Christians, and Jews. But al-Husayni’s call for Jews to join the Palestinian movement in
the post-Ottoman context was a residue of social and political order that had already vanished and been replaced
by a new (British) imperial order of partitions.15 Under this new order, Arab-Palestinian invitations like the one that
al-Husayni published, infuriated not only the Zionist leadership, but alsomany among the native Sephardi community.
In response to a similar call a year earlier the Sephardic Union claimed:
The Sephardim of Eretz Yisrael [the Land of Israel] strongly object to reports that they support the Arab delega-
tion. They are in complete unity with the rest of the Jewish community in Eretz Yisrael and its demands for the
promises about the creation of a Jewish national home to be fulfilled. (Doar Hayom, 1921, p. 2)
But as al-Husayni’s call implies, this alliance with Zionismwas far from being self evident.
During the late Ottoman era, many native Jews tried to distance themselves from the European-colonialist aspects
of the Zionist movement and to position themselves as part of the imagined local Ottoman homeland alongside the
native Arabs.16 While they welcomed Jewish immigration, most of them viewed Zionism’s European character as an
interruption, if not a destruction, of the fabric of life in Palestine and were critical of its separatist approach. The ques-
tion of the status of the Arabic language was at the heart of their critique.
The story of Yosef David Maman, a Sephardi Jew who taught in a school in the Galilee, is telling in this context.
Maman regularly published articles in the Sephardi-owned Hebrew newspaper Ha-herut. Originally, these articles
primarily translated and interpreted, and to an extent mediated, the criticism of the Zionism’s European character
expressed in the Arab press to the Ashkenazi newcomers. This mediation was part of an effort to reshape the rela-
tions between Zionism and the local community, and hence to reshape Zionism as such—to render it closer to both the
language and the people of the land; Arabs andArabic. However, in a series of articles published in the summer of 1911,
a change in his rhetoric can be discerned, as Maman begins to criticize sharply the newcomers’ refusal to learn Arabic
and integrate into the indigenous society:
And when your dear reader will claim: “And how shall I read, when I cannot read Yishmael’s language?”[Arabic] I
will reply:…You the internal wonderer [Jew] come to France and learn French, go toGermany and learnGerman,
Argentina and learn Spanish, come to America and learn English, and why is it when you come to Turkey—which
is better for you than all these—you will not learn Turkish, and when you want to enter Palestine you will not
learn Arabic—the language of the people of the land with whom you live every day? (Maman (1911a),1; authors’
translation)
By pointing to the uniqueness of this refusal to learn the language of the land, Maman exposes the Jewish newcom-
ers underlying racist attitude. The disregard of Arabic by the new Jewish settlers was, according to him, part of their
racist perception of the local Arab population. This includes the Arab-Jews, which they viewed as “total Arabs” (aravim
gemurim) (Maman (1911b) p. 1; authors’ translation). This alienation from the people, the language, and the local polit-
ical situation could be solved, he argued, only by changing the new immigrants’ relation to the Arabic language—a
change, it seems, he eventually despaired of:
And if you do not know how to read [the Arabic press], look for someone else who will translate for you, who
will explain to you the full extent of the situation, because we [the Sephardic natives] are now inclined to agree
[among us] not to help you further on this subject. It seems that our help [in translating from Arabic] only
increased your indifference… to the land you are in, and to the governing people under whose auspices you
live. (Maman, 1911a; authors’ translation)
Maman’s rejection of his role as a mediator of language (translator) was in essence a refusal to cooperate with the
colonial scheme thatdismissed the local culture and language, and that saw locality itself as a threat. Recent scholarship
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has focused on the role of native Arab-Jews as translators or mediators (Gribetz, 2014; Halperin, 2015; Jacobson &
Naor 2016), also as part of a larger tendency to see them as hybrid phenomena, trapped in the borderland between
Hebrew and Arabic national poles.17 But Maman did not see himself as a moderator or facilitator between European
Jewswho immigrated toPalestine andPalestinianArabs. Rather than an attempt tomediate betweenopposingworlds,
Maman’s original act of translation (alongside hundreds of articles translated fromArabic toHebrewbyother Sephardi
natives) was part of an effort to refuse these very divisions between Jews and Arabs, Hebrew and Arabic, settlers and
locals. That is, his (and others’) goal was to expose the new Jewish settlers to the local Arab political environment in
order to encourage them to engage with the local political leaders and intellectuals. It was when the potentiality of
shared space was repudiated and he was called, instead, to translate, to work within the logic of binarism—albeit as a
hybrid entity, which as suchmediates the two sides of the binary—thatMaman abandoned his position.
These words of Maman were part of a heated debate over an enterprise to establish a Jewish newspaper in
Arabic, led by Dr Shimon Moyal—a native Palestinian who was deeply involved in Arab and Ottoman intellectual
circles. Objecting to Moyal’s initiative, Abraham Ludvipol, a prominent Ashkenazi Zionist journalist who immigrated
to Palestine in 1907, wrote a series of articles published in the same year as Maman (1911),18 in which he sought to
create a divide between two groups of Sephardi Jews—the “nationalists” (Zionists) who “present… themselves to us
as products of the newNational Revival”; and theArab assimilators likeMoyal orMaman. To the (Sephardi) nationalists
he suggested that they should distance themselves from Moyal’s initiative because as “Jews we have no need for
a Hebrew [i.e., Jewish] newspaper in Arabic” (Hazvi, October 4, 1911, quoted in Behar, 2017, p. 320). The “young
Sephardi” therefore faced a choice: to join the Zionist project as a separatist (colonial) project and renounce their
(Arabic) language and links to the local community; or to be labeled Arab assimilators who were alienating themselves
from “the newNational Revival.” In this sense, Ludvipol’s articles present a mirror image to the call by al-Husayni with
which we opened this section.
But unlike the response a decade later of the Sephardic Union to the Arab-Palestinians’ delegation to London—a
response in which they aligned themselves with the Zionist project—in 1911Moyal rejected the very choice itself. His
wordsmerit quoting at length:
Tell us, our guest Mr Ludvipol, dressed in a coat made of European culture, who pretends to furnish with knowl-
edge, education, andwisdom thosewhose attires are actually thicker thanhis: Have you ever had the opportunity
of embarking on a long journey to find yourself suddenly caught in heavy rain, and then invited by a gypsy to be a
guest in his tent? On your departure, did your education andmanners guide you to condemn the tent’s owner for
his poverty, wildness, and parochialism or, instead, take your leave of him with gratitude and praise? Even if you
primarily view us as Mizrahim, you ought to remember that you are our guest, and that local Jews and our
ancestors suffered many years to maintain their national identity amidst the many national groups that
generation after generation ruled the Land. These are the Land of Israel’s local Jews whom you value as
of zero worth but who are nonetheless the primary foundation for Israelite national revival. (Ha-Herut,
1911, October 19, quoted in Behar, 2017, 321; our emphasis)
If Zionists saw themselves as indigenous people returning to their land, Moyal uses the nomad analogy to reverse the
settler/native equation: while the natives are the owners of the land and hold the power to endow it with a national
affiliation, Ludvipol is marked as a European settler, a guest who tries to impose his perspectives onto internal eastern
affairs rather than being grateful for whatever hospitality he receives.
The Jewish newspaper in Arabicwas intended to be both themedium and symbol of a different approach to locality,
butMoyal never received support from the Zionistmovement. At some point he suggested selling off one of the Jewish
settlements in order to sponsor the newspaper, a suggestion which in Ludvipol’s point of view only strengthened his
perception thatMoyal preferred the Arabic language to the Jewish settlement project (Hazvi, October 4, 1911, quoted
in Behar, 2017, 320).
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In 1914 Moyal decided to sponsor a newspaper himself (together with Esther Azari-Moyal and Nissim Malul). The
paper, called Sawt al-Uthmaniyah (The Voice of Ottomanism), was published from January to October 1914 (Jacobson,
2011). Moyal’s vision of a joint Hebrew-Arabic culture and homeland collapsed together with his newspaper and
fortune. He died during the war after serving as a hospital manager in Ottoman service.
4 THE AGE OF PARTITION
The 1911–1914 debateswe outlined in the previous sectionwere part of a (failed) effort byMaman,Moyal, and others
to reclaim Jewish settlement in Palestine as a non-colonial project by transforming the Jewish immigrants into inhabi-
tants of the land. These transformationswere to take place through the acquisition ofArabic and their assimilation into
local Arab society. Such efforts at mediation can be seen as attempts to create newmodes of locality and belonging in
which Jewish presence would not be a settler presence.19 Or they can be seen as an effort to preserve such a mode of
belonging despite waves of immigration, to fold the new Jewish immigrants into their own position as Jewish-natives;
as if to keep open an identity gateway through which the Ashkenazi Jews could now enter—either as guests (to return
toMoyal’s words), or as permanent allies, contingent on their willingness to accept the terms of this alliance.
We cannot fully unpack here the reasons leading from the more complex and liminal position of the 1911–1914
debates to the rejection of al-Husayni’s “come to us” invitation in 1922 (and even this framing is schematic and some-
what misleading, and is used here more to indicate possibilities than to unfold a detailed history). World War I; the
Balfour Deceleration and the new logic of separation it foregrounded; the changes in imperial lineages (the shift from
the Ottoman to the British empire), which dramatically transformed international framings of conflict, ethnicity, or
nationalism; the material changes relating to labor, the accumulation of wealth, and above all to land; the intensifica-
tion of violent confrontations between Jews and Arabs; all these have changed the political and social balance not only
between Jews andArabs but also between local Sephardi Jews andAshkenazi settlers (Jacobson&Naor, 2016). As part
of these changes, the Sephardi Jews,whohadheld aprominent positiondue to their unique status asOttoman subjects,
lost their status, while the European Zionist movement became the official representatives of the Jewish community
vis-à-vis British officials. Within this complex history, we very briefly point to the story of land purchase as one factor
that mirrors the mediating language efforts described above. If settler colonialism is primarily about land (as we learn
from Wolfe or from history), then it may not come us a surprise that these enterprises ended up by swallowing the
efforts that operated on amore cultural level.
At the same time as the events recounted abovewere unfolding, a different type ofmediation effortwas also under-
way. Toward the end of the Ottoman era a number of prominent Sephardi natives, including some of the supporters of
theArabic newspaper initiative, also acted asmediators for Jewish organizations seeking to purchase and develop land
(Campos, 2007; Glass & Kark, 1991). Due to their fluency in Arabic, their connections with the local Arab population,
and their social, legal, and political status in theOttomanEmpire, these Sephardi Jewswere able to serve asmiddlemen
and go-betweens in land transactions: they could create and translate documents and navigate formal and informal
processes, making them a major asset to these organizations.20 Furthermore, they also taught Arabic to some of the
Ashkenazi land entrepreneurs, whowithout a knowledge of the language could not effectively “redeem” the land.
But as they soon came to realize, these land entrepreneurs’ grasp ofArabicwas not away to build bridges, but rather
a tool for “kill[ing] a people—conquer [the] land and dislocate its language”21 (Shilo, 1990, p. 49). Thus, the vision of
teachingArabic to the newly arrived Jewswas given a twist: while the native Sephardi Jews found an audience for their
claim that the study of Arabic was crucial, the language became a tool for settlement rather than away of constructing
a shared space. Thus, Arabic functioned in this context no longer as the language of the land (sfat haaretz), as the local
Sephardim saw it (a local language which was also their own language), but as the language of the other—and, further,
the other whom one dispossesses.
As we saw, once land was moved from Arab to Jewish hands, it became a Hebrew land, and Hebrew itself became a
mark of both Europeanness and new Jewish localness; thus, the meaning of locality itself shifted, pushing Arab Jews
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into the margins of the Zionist ideal of the Jewish homeland. Paradoxically, then, their cooperation with the settlers’
land-purchase activities, which depended on their ability to speak the language of the land, reinforced the process of
negating this language and the nexus of identity it embodied. Moreover, in a shifting reality of mass immigration and
challenges to global (imperial) orders, the involvement of local Jews in land transaction aroused suspicion and criticism
among Arab-Palestinians and further fractured the idea of a shared space (see Campos, 2007). The materiality of land
purchase thus created pressures to delineate the native/settler divide, to stabilize loyalties along more rigid lines of
division, to re-align interests and with them (or against them, or despite them) ideologies. It was in this context of land
purchase, then, that theHebrew–Arabic nexusmarked the transformation fromnative to settler, both symbolically and
in practice.
This might present itself as a simple story of two opposite trajectories: if as mediators of language the native Jews
sought to construct a political space that was an alternative to the logic of settlement, as mediators involved in land
purchase they participated in the ethos of “conquering the land”; that is, they were active agents in and of the Zion-
ist project as a settler project. But this would be an over-simplification. Not only does it misrepresent the position of
these political and social agents, some of whom were critics of Zionism and were engaged in this process merely as
entrepreneurs (Tamari, 2008); it further misses their multiple (native) political and social positions and their changing
and sometimes contradictory associations and loyalties.
In Zionist historiography and narrative, all these complexities and critiques are erased. If the contribution of native
Sephardic Jews to life in Palestine is remembered, it is as supporters—usually as followers—of the settler project,
always in order to entrench, and not contest, the mainstream Zionist narrative. Importantly, however, this is not yet
another case of what Wolfe terms assimilation: a process in which a group of natives becomes part of the settlers’
colonial-formation. This is not only because from the outset they occupied an unstable position between the natives
and settlers in ways that make categorizing them as this or that problematic from the start. Further, the native Arab-
Jews’ “assimilation” into the Zionist formation (albeit often fractured and partial), was accompanied by an opposite
need to preserve the indigenous status of the local Arab-Jews. By re-reclaiming the local/native presence of Arab-Jews
in Palestine, Israeli Jews could—and still can—make claims for the land and for their own indigeneity. Marking this dual
trajectory is the aim of the next section.
5 FROM NATIVES TO SETTLERS AND BEYOND
In 1873 the Meyouhas family moved outside the Old City walls of Jerusalem to Silwan, a village that roughly a cen-
tury later would become one of themost contested sites of Jewish settlement in East Jerusalem and its accompanying
project of gradual transfer. Nowadays, this project is primarily promoted by the settler organization ELAD (a Hebrew
acronym for “To the City of David”), which was established in 1986 and has since then become one of the most pow-
erful political actors in Jerusalem. As well as receiving generous support from the state, the ELAD Foundation also
collaborates closely with the Jerusalem municipality, the ministries of education and defense, and the Israel Antiqui-
ties Authority. As a result, every year hundreds of thousands of young students, educators, soldiers, hi-tech employees,
young Jews fromabroad, and tourists are channeled by the Foundation (which has almost completelymonopolizedOld
City tourism) to “discover the secrets of biblical Jerusalem.”
As part of these organized tours, many tourists stop in front of theMeyouhas’s home. There they can see an Israeli
flag in thewindow and are told that in this house, one of the first Jewish settlements started almost 150 years ago. The
new Jewish settlement in Silwan (which has also sought to impose a new Hebrew name on the village—Ir David, “City
of David”), can thus be presented as a return to indigenous Jewish property, a reclaiming of a Jewish past—or better:
sustaining a Jewish continuum. These notions of “reclaiming” and “continuum” are made possible by the very past-
presence of local Sephardi Jews in the land.
While the settlers invading Palestinian homes in Silwan are among the most extreme in the settler movement, the
City of David has never been a marginal or extreme story. Rather, it is a faithful reflection of the foundation of the
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Zionist mainstream: revisiting the biblical story on which to base the return of the Jews to Palestine and to create an
imaginary line connecting Zionist nationalism and ancient Jewish sovereignty. This leap in time makes it possible to
base in history demands for Jewish ownership of the territory while wiping out the history of the land and its Arab
inhabitants.
Ironically, one of the first Jews to criticize this exclusivist narrative was Yosef Meyouhas, who was a child when
his familymoved to Silwan in the 19th century.Meyouhas got to know the Arab Palestinian tradition, which became an
integral part of his own tradition. Hewas one of the first translators and documenters of PalestinianArab oral andwrit-
ten culture intoHebrew, aspart of anattempt to forgea connectionbetween the Jewishnewcomersand the indigenous
Arabs (Evri, 2019).
Meyouhas’s most important work was the trilogy “Children of Arabia,” a compendium of translations into Hebrew of
Biblical tales from the local PalestinianMuslim oral tradition. In it, he proposed an unusual analysis of the relationship
between the biblical text, the Arab inhabitants, and the physical space of the land, and offered a political alternative
to the doctrine that still dominates the Zionist narrative. Instead of seeing the biblical text as a basis for the historical
Jewish ownership of the land, he highlighted its role in the center of a shared Judeo-Muslim tradition.22 Today, some
75 years after his death, the only opportunity students have to learn about Meyouhas is from the settler Zionist per-
spective, in an organized tour in the “City of David,” organized by those who work to destroy and eliminate the shared
Hebrew–Arabic space into which hewas born andwhich he endeavored to preserve.
***
This resurfacing of the indigenous status of Palestinian Jews becamemore significant after 1967, with the occupa-
tion of East Jerusalem and theWest Bank. In places like Sheikh Jarrah, Silwan, or Hebron, settlers23 have dispossessed
Palestinian Arabs from their homes and lands (and continue to do so), claiming that they are ’’returning’’ to the “absen-
teeproperties” of nativePalestinian Jewswhowereexpelled fromtheir homes in1929, 1936, or1948. Thenewsettlers
thus draw ties between themselves and the native Jewish communities that used to reside in these places, portraying
themselves as the legal and historical successors of the original Jewish inhabitants. From a model of coexistence and
shared land, which was very much anchored in a shared Arabic culture, the native Jews have thus come to represent
and justify a model of land theft and dispossession.
Nevertheless, the lines that supposedly connect the new settlers to the native Arab-Jewish communities are fictive
and thus fragile. In December 2006, armed settlers took over an area near the vegetable market in Hebron, claiming
that they were simply restoring Jewish land that the city’s Muslims had wrongfully taken from the native Jewish com-
munity. In response, a group of 37 descendants of the historical Hebron Jewish community took out an advertisement
in the Israeli dailyHaaretz, declaring:
Settlers living in the heart of Hebron do not have the right to speak in the name of the old Jewish community…
These settlers are alien to the way of life of the Hebron Jews, who created over the generations a culture of peace
and understanding between peoples and faiths in the city. (Haaretz, December, 6, 1996, quoted in Campos,
2007, p. 41)
This story of the appropriation of native identity has not then been settled, and can therefore be disrupted and
redrafted in times to come.
6 THEORETICAL INFERENCES
To understand the relevance of these stories beyond their local context we should return to the defining categories
of the settler colonial paradigm. While it does not pose our question specifically, the lecture by Mamdani with which
we opened doesmention natives, at least those coming “wholly fromwithin Africa” (Mamdani, 1998, p. 2) who become
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settlers. Settlers, in his account, emerge throughmovement; they are geographical outsiders.24 ForMamdani, movement
is so central to the formation of the settler that ultimately, “every native outside of his or her own home area was a
settler of sorts, someone considered non-indigenous” (Mamdani, 1998, p. 3). Our case study, however, focused on a
group of people who stayed put and were transformed into settlers by the formation of the settler state; those who
were already there, geographical insiders, who nonetheless became settlers.
ButMamdani, and, following him, Veracini, does seemovement that is distinctive from this mode of settlement, and
differentiates between settlers’ and immigrants’ modes of movement. These two groups “move in inherently different
ways” aswell as “towards very different places”: unlike immigrants, settlers do not seek to integrate into existing struc-
tures, to become part of the place to which they move, or to protect their identities within their own enclaves in that
place, but rather to transform the place so that it takes their own image; to eliminate the natives and so to become the
new law of the place (Veracini, 2010, p. 3). The movement that results in the “settlerization” of the moving person is
therefore a function of their relation to place and people, and the fostering of a non-settler relation was the precise
goal of the local Palestinian Jews in our story.
Movement, therefore, is neither a necessary nor a sufficient category to distinguish settler from native. Fanon sees
the primary category of settler colonialism not as place but as race: the settlers are first and foremost racial outsiders.
InvertingMarx, Fanon (2004, p. 3) argues that “in the colonies the economic infrastructure is also a superstructure. The
cause is effect: You are rich because you are white, you are white because you are rich.” Race becomes the foundation
of themovement of dialectics.
In our case, however, the racial division is at best blurred. The shift in the position of the Arab-Jews across the
native/settler divide was not a complete and final realignment of racial lines. It was not, in other words, a complete
transformation that has turned theArab-Jews into settlers by creating a new racial unity on the settlers’ side.Whereas
de-Arabization efforts aimed at distancing the Arab Jews from the contexts of their locality, and whereas the elimi-
nation of their Arabness (and their Arabic language) was perceived as the key factor in their inclusion into the Zionist
project and into the settler collective (Shenhav, 2006; Shohat, 1999), these did not put an end to a racial ideology that
has continued to marginalize, if not exclude them from the very project in which they were presumably included, and
that has been accompanied withmaterial, symbolic, and cultural marginalization.
Furthermore, as we showed here, at times, it was precisely the Arabic language, alongside the Palestinian locality
that became a platform for the settlerization of the Arab-Jews through practices of purchasing land, reclaiming indi-
geneity, or claiming domiciles. Thus, even though the connection to Arabness was perceived as a threat to the Zionist
enterprise, sometimes, it was precisely their ongoing racialization as Arabs, alongside their knowledge of Arabic, that
was crucial for the development of the Zionist project itself, and for the formation of the settler/nativematrix in Pales-
tine. De-Arabization therefore was never meant to be fully accomplished.
Thus, the category “Jews” is decisive here in marking the line between settler and native, but it, too, is insufficient
to set rigid lines of divisions due to its unsettled position in the oriental–racial divide between east and west (Anidjar,
2007). Perhaps “line” is an altogether wrong spatial metaphor.
We have seen, with Fanon, that these racial distinctions according to which the colonizer/colonized divide is orga-
nized do not fully hold. His use of the term “species” indicates the importance of race to the analysis, but for him, too,
“in the colonies… the ruling species is first and foremost the outsider from elsewhere” (Fanon, 2004, p. 5). Ultimately,
“race and place are inextricable” (Wolfe, 2016, p. 16). Mamdani makes this claim in regard to the movement of various
groups in Africa: while it is primarily economically motivated, being a movement of a group elsewhere, it is racialized,
rendering its members into settlers. Wolfe later took Mamdani’s insight with respect to Africa (though without being
familiar with it, or without referring to it), and further developed it within amore systematic critique of race. In ameta-
dialectical move, after Fanon replaced economy with race as the foundation of the dialectical colonial order of things,
Wolfe (2016, pp. 57–58) shows how, in the settler colonial setting, race emerges as a function of territoriality, which is
itself a question of profit.25
It is through this understanding of race as entangled with territorialized profit that Wolfe (2012, p. 310) tried to
solve the anomaly of the position of the Arab-Jews in the Zionist settler colonial formation. Comparing them with
12 EVRI AND KOTEF
African Americans in the USA or convicts in 18th and 19th century Australia, he saw them as examples of a work-
force that was brought in from outside to replace native workers (as was indeed the case with the Yemenites in the
early 20th century). This comparison, which others make use of (e.g. Shafir, 1989; Yiftachel, 2006) is valid, at least in
part, in relation to the Arab-Jewish immigrants who arrived before 1948 and in larger numbers after 1948, but it is
not valid to our case study of the native Arab-Jews. This is not merely because of the fact that they were not brought
from anywhere—a claim that should be questioned in regard to other Arab-Jews as well, who are often characterized
in the literature as immigrants even though for a long period they belonged to the same geo-political space. It is also
not merely because the figures we met here cannot be reduced to cheap labor power at the disposal of the colonial
enterprise—they were part of the intellectual and economical elite in local Palestinian society. It is also because, as we
saw, the group in question (and by inference other groups), cannot simply and fully be aligned to the categories that the
paradigm of settler colonialism dictates. This was certainly not true at the historical moment we examined, before the
space has beenmore or less stabilizedwithin a settler project, but, as a consequence of this, it is also not the case today,
when different positionalities are being called for, both to fortify and challenge this structure.
7 CONCLUSION
In this articlewe explored thematrix connecting language and land, in order to track the formation of the settler/native
divide in Israel/Palestine and explore the different and sometimes conflicting narratives that this formation embodies.
Examining the negotiations over the language of the land, the status and meaning of land itself, and relations between
Jews andArabs in the formative years of the pre-state era, we offered a critical analysis of the settler/native distinction
in Zionist discourse, and proposed that these localized events were a basis for reconsidering these categories overall.
For this purpose, we explored optional scenarios for a Jewish national existence in Palestine that were put forward
by native Jews—scenarios that were not linked to a settler colonial mechanism, but instead to an indigenous logic of
shared land based onmultiple positionalities and amultilingual cultural sphere. Our analysis also revealed some of the
first anti-colonial critiques of the Zionist settler project specifically by native Jewish intellectuals, of its negation of
Arabic as the language of the land, and its negation of the native Arabs’ rights to the land.
Language plays a crucial role in our discussion. It serves as the litmus paper by which the complexities and multi-
plicity of the racial divides can be tested. In the Zionist settler project language served as a racial marker, separating
Hebrews and Arabs; it played a crucial role in the negation and elimination of Arab Palestinians’ history and their con-
nection to the land, mainly by erasing Arabic as the language of the land and replacing it with Hebrew. Language also
marked the transition of Jews from Europe to theMiddle East and from being Semites to being Europeans. Finally, lan-
guagewas anoptional vehicle for preventing or reversing the settlermechanismby replacing the erasure ofArabicwith
bilingual or bi-national political and cultural options.
This article, then, offered a historical account of the transformation of identity; but it could also be taken as a more
conceptual analysis of the foundational categories of the settler colonialism paradigm. In this respect, our story is only
one piece within a much larger mosaic of categories that have been transformed along the settler/native divide, along
similar or very different ways, with the formation of the Jewish state. These categories include the Druze, who were
largely “turned into settlers” via their interpolation into the militarized ideology of the Israeli space; the Bedouin, who
also joined (in a smaller numbers compare to the Druze) the Israeli army, and who face continuous struggles over the
right to settle on their own lands while their status as natives has been negated and denied (Yiftachel, Roded, & Kedar,
2016); and the Samaritans, who hold dual (Palestinian and Israeli) citizenship, and wander between multiple loyalties
and affiliations across the settler–nativematrix. Telling each of these storieswill complicate the categories further, and
will require consideration of other factors that “settle” the settler/native divide.
In the wake of the Nation State Law, these issues have resurfacedmore bluntly and lucidly. The lawmakes a claim—
that is thereby anchored in a legal order—that Jewish people have an exclusive historical right to own the land and
live in it. Significantly, the law does so by also removing the formal status of Arabic as the second official language of
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the state. Whereas this status was often but the empty letter of the law and did not reflect social and political reality,
therewas still a symbolic change in declaring that Hebrewwas the sole official language of the land. Joining other legal
changes, the law reinforces the settler colonialist order “in which civic rights are the settler rights,” (Mamdani, 1998,
p. 2) manifesting, yet again, the centrality of language for this project, which we examined here from its inception. But
while the Nation State Law seeks to entrench and protect settlers’ rights even further, it also brings again to the fore
the fact that the story of the Arab-Jews of Palestine/Israel is yet unfinished.
NOTES
1We would like to thank the Leverhulme Trust for two individual grants that have made this research possible: the Lever-
hulme Early Career Fellowship for Yuval Evri, and a Research Fellowship for Hagar Kotef.
2We decided not to confine ourselves to a single term such as “Sephardi Jews,” “Arab-Jews,” “Palestinian Jews” or “native
Jews,” but to allow themany terms used tomark the Jewish native-born in the discourse of the time. For further discussion
on thesemultiple categorizations, see Tamari (2008); Shohat (1999); Jacobson andNaor (2016).
3 One of the distinctions that is at times made between settler colonialism and colonialism is based on their racial logic.
Whereas colonialism is based on the rigid divide between the colonizer and colonized, the assimilatory racial logic orga-
nizing the settler/native divide is not dichotomic. At least in the case of Israel—indeed the Jewish state—assimilation is not
considered an option. One can argue that in this sense, Israel is situated on a junction between colonialism and settler colo-
nialism. However, looking at many other settler colonial contexts, we see that assimilation often does not erase racial—and
colonial—distinctions. Therefore, the rigid native/settler divide keeps surfacing over land and resources struggles in North
America, Australia, and elsewhere.
4 Fanonwrote before the paradigm of comparative settler colonialism had been stabilized and he therefore does not think in
these terms. Moreover, some (e.g., Veracini, 2010) have explicitly distinguished between the Algerian case and the classic
cases of settler colonialism, based on the tendency of French colonists to identifywith the Frenchmetropole,marking it as a
“colonial” rather than a “settler colonial” case.Others, however, havemaintained that the status ofAlgeria as a settler colony
must be considered seriously, and there was even a special issue of Settler Colonial Studies (Vol. 8, No. 2, 2018) dedicated to
Algeria as a settler colony. A similar approach to that was expressed in many of that issue’s articles, see: Barclay, F., Chopin,
C. A., & Evans, M. (2018); and following Stoler (2006), we believe that such distinctions between “classic” and non-typical
cases of settler colonialism are based on amisleading unifying claim. See Section 2 of this essay.
5 Ella Shohat (1988) was the first to identify the relations between the Zionist colonial-racial mechanisms used towards the
Arab-Palestinians and those used towards the Arab-Jews.
6 For the analytical andpolitical benefits of applying this framework to the Israeli case, see Jabary-Salamancaet al. (2012). See
also other chapters in the same volume. PatrickWolfe (2016) dedicated a significant segment of his comparative account of
settler colonialism to the Israeli case, marking it as a settler colonialism case par excellence. For a somewhat more nuanced
application of the paradigm to the case of Israel/Palestine, seeVeracini (2013). For the limits of this paradigm in this context,
see also Busbridge (2018).
7We are fully aware that our position over the settler colonial theory could be mistakenly understood as a reckless con-
flation of colonialism and settler colonialism. What we propose here, however, is a different reading of the settler colonial
paradigm that problematizes someof its fundamental assumptions and calls to understand it, notwithstanding its important
comparative dimension, as a category that should bemore attuned to particular contexts.
8 For more on theOttoman sectarian divide seeMakdisi (2000).
9 The project of the settler state is to “construct . . . indigenous people as racially fragile,” so they can be easily assimilated
into the settler cohort (Wolfe, 2016, p. 39). Racial ambiguity is a regressive, rather than progressive, project when racial
boundaries are “historical rather than biological”: indigenes are the “prior owners of the land” (Wolfe, 2016, p. 57), and
assimilation would eliminate them as owners.
10 On the shift of approach seeMorris (1987). Cohen (2015) claims that the turning point of the imagination is actually 1929.
11 In so doingwe tap into a rich seamof literature in the Israeli/Palestinian context, includingAzoulay (2014), Doumani (1992),
Shenhav (2012), and Tamari (2008).
12 Gil Eyal (2006, p. 44) offers a more complex picture of the Zionist settlers during the movement’s early stages in Palestine.
He points out how, in the process of negation of exile and the quest for internal change in the figure of the Jew, belonging to
the landwas at times expressed by an imitation of native Palestinian culture and customs as being representative of ancient
Jewish culture and identity. The trajectory of movement (“westbound”) is therefore also more ambivalent than a clear-cut
movement from east to west, as our schematic outline suggests. See also Saposnik (2010).
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13 For a somewhat alternative analysis, see Leshem (2016).
14 Evri (2019), Behar and Ben-Dor Benite (2014), and Behar (2017).
15 On this transformation, see Cohen (2015); Jacobson (2011).
16 On the ethos of shared homeland in the local Sephardi discourse, see Campos (2010); Khalidi (1997).
17 Eyal (2006, p. 10), for example, argues that during the early Zionist era, different types of hybrids “at one and the same
time marked and transgressed the boundary between Jews and Arab in the pre-state period.” He categorizes the native
Sephardim who were “well integrated into urban Palestinian society” as one of these hybrid types (2006, p. 11). See also
Svirsky and Ben-Arie (2017) andHalperin (2015).
18 This debate has recently received some scholarly attention. See Behar (2017), Campos (2010), and Jacobson (2011).
19 Following Mamdani’s (1998) important distinction, we can say that rather than being settlers who came to change the law
of the land, they were immigrants who had come to inhabit this law.
20 The Sephardi involvement in land purchase took place mainly during the end of the Ottoman era, and declined significantly
after World War I. By 1917 the Zionist movement had managed to purchase more than 420,000 dunams of land; most of
the sellers were Arab (absentee) landlords (see Cohen, 2008, p. 31).
21 These were the words of Khalil al-Sakakini, the famous Palestinian educator whowas also one of these teachers.
22 OnMeyouhas’s translation and political model, see Evri, 2019.
23 This was not the settlement of Jewish immigrants in Palestine during imperial times, but the illegal settlement in theWest
Bank, as part of what is now known as the settler movement.
24 Both white and African settlers are therefore defined by a movement that ultimately becomes indistinguishable from race:
“The word for the white settler in Kiswahili is mzungu. Mzungu, however, does not literally mean a white person. It simply
means a restless person, a personwhowill not stay in one place” (Mamdani, 1998, p. 2).
25 This iswhy inplaceswhere landgeneratedmaximumprofit (suchas in relation to the indigenouspeoples inNorthAmericaor
Australia)we find one type of racism,whereas in societieswhere labor generatedmore profit we find another (as in the case
of African Americans and in the history of slavery). Often the two coexist, in differentiable, even if integrated, economies.
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